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Abstract
This paper compares diﬀerent subsidies in an R&D growth model with competitive suppliers
of a ﬁnal good and monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Unlike existing studies with
lump-sum taxes and ﬁxed labor, we assume distortionary taxes and elastic labor, ﬁnding some
new insights. First, subsidizing R&D investment is more eﬀective than subsidizing ﬁnal output
or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods in terms of promoting growth. Second, in
terms of raising welfare, the R&D subsidy may also be more eﬀective than the other subsidies
and all of them are dominated by their mix, but none can achieve the social optimum.
JEL classiﬁcation: D42; D61; O31; O38
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R&D activities for innovations, a major driving force for growth, are subsidized in many indus-
trial countries and receive increasing attention in economic studies. The rationale for government
intervention involving R&D activities originates from the fact that innovators of new goods face
knowledge spillovers and diﬃculties in appropriating the beneﬁts of innovations (e.g., Romer, 1990;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones and Williams, 2000). Due to this
externality, there would be too little incentive to engage costly innovations without government
intervention, as innovators do not internalize the gains from their innovations. A typical form of
government intervention dealing with this R&D externality is to grant monopoly rights to innova-
tors in such forms as patents and trademarks. However, even if monopoly protection is granted
permanently to successful innovators selling their goods in the model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) with expanding varieties of intermediate goods via R&D, the decentralized equilibrium al-
ways suﬀers too little R&D investment and thus too slow growth.1 In such a model, pricing above
marginal costs is necessary for R&D to break even on the one hand, but reduces the demand for
intermediate goods below the ﬁrst-best level on the other hand. That is, granting monopoly rights
alone does not eliminate under-investment in R&D in the presence of the R&D externality.
In order to internalize the R&D externality and correct the distortion of the monopoly pricing,
various types of subsidies have been examined in the literature with lump-sum taxes and ﬁxed
labor supply. As expected, the R&D subsidy can indeed promote R&D investment and growth
(e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). Much less obvious is that
the R&D subsidy is dominated by other types of subsidies in terms of social welfare (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995): Subsidizing either ﬁnal output produced by competitive ﬁrms or the purchase of
intermediate goods produced by monopolistic ﬁrms can achieve the social optimum, but subsidizing
R&D, though also welfare improving, cannot. This is somewhat surprising as the actual government
policy has tended to rely on R&D subsidies, e.g. the United States has long had an R&D subsidy
1Over-investment in R&D may also occur in models with diﬀerent settings but much empirical evidence supports
under-investment in R&D (e.g., Cohen and Levin, 1991; Griliches, 1992; Nadiri, 1993; Jones and Williams, 1998).
1in place. One reason seems to be that the R&D subsidy is an “inexpensive” tool in terms of lost
revenue, which can only be made up with distortionary taxes, since lump-sum taxes assumed in
the related studies mentioned above are hard to implement.
Once limiting our funding options to distortionary taxes and allowing for elastic labor supply,
several interesting questions arise: First, do these subsidies still stimulate growth and improve
welfare? Second, are the subsidies to ﬁnal or intermediate products still better than the R&D
subsidy? Third, can these subsidies completely eliminate the distortion of the monopoly pricing
and internalize the R&D externality to achieve the social optimum in a decentralized setting?
Finally, if the social optimum cannot be achieved, can diﬀerent subsidies be combined to generate
a better outcome than using a single subsidy?2
The objective of this paper is to answer these questions. Speciﬁcally, using distortionary taxes
we examine the diﬀerent types of subsidies and their combinations in terms of their eﬀects on growth
and welfare. In order to do so, we extend the R&D growth model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
with variety expansion by incorporating elastic labor supply.
Our diﬀerent approach brings to light several new insights. First, subsidizing R&D investment
is more eﬀective than subsidizing ﬁnal output or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods in
terms of promoting growth. This is because the former directly reduces the cost of R&D investment
at a lower tax cost compared to the latter forms of subsidies. The lower tax revenue for the R&D
subsidy to achieve any given growth target than other subsidies does give the R&D subsidy an
advantage when the tax has to be distortionary.3 Second, in terms of raising welfare, the R&D
subsidy may also be more eﬀective than the other subsidies and all of them are dominated by
their mix, but none can achieve the social optimum, because of the relative strength and weakness
associated with the diﬀerent types of subsidies. As mentioned above, the R&D subsidy tends to be
more eﬀective in engendering dynamic gains at a lower tax cost than the other types of subsidies, in
2This is not an issue in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) because a single subsidy, either to ﬁnal output or to the
purchase of intermediate goods, can achieve the social optimum with the aid of lump-sum taxes.
3When the tax is lump-sum in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), this lower tax revenue needed to ﬁnance one
subsidy than the others does not matter.
2a direction of mitigating the under-investment caused by the R&D externality. As in the literature,
however, the R&D subsidy is less eﬀective than the other subsidies in reducing the eﬃciency loss
associated with monopoly pricing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model and solves
ﬁrms and households’ optimization problems. Section 3 describes the social planner’s problem,
which is to be compared with decentralized solutions. Section 4 derives the results. The last
section concludes.
2. The model
The model is an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 6) by considering a labor-leisure choice and distortionary taxes. In
this model, technological progress results from intentional investment in R&D that aims at creating
new types of intermediate goods for ﬁnal production.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated with a continuum of identical inﬁnitely-lived households with a (constant)
mass L. Each household has one unit of time which is allocated between leisure l and production









e−ρtdt, θ > 0, ρ > 0,   > 0( 1 )
where c is consumption, ρ t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,  the taste for leisure, and θ the inverse of the
constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To economize notations, we omit time subscript
t whenever no confusion may arise.
Household income, from assets and work, is allocated between consumption and saving:
˙ a = ar +( 1− τ)w(1 − l) − c, (2)
where τ is the tax rate on labor income, a the amount of assets, ˙ a the time derivative of a (or
investment), r the real interest rate, and w the wage rate. Here, we abstract from taxing interest
3income because it would further complicate the diﬃcult welfare analysis. If interest income were
taxed at the same rate as wages are taxed, the tax base would be broadened, but the after-tax
rate of return on investment in R&D would fall. To generate the same level of tax revenue for
subsidies, the broadened tax base reduces the tax rate on wage income and thus may lead to higher
labor supply (hence higher demand for the intermediate goods), while the reduced rate of return on
R&D investment reduces R&D investment. The net eﬀects on growth and welfare of the uniform
income tax are therefore unclear. However, with this uniform income tax, all the subsidies that we
consider would still stimulate R&D activities and growth, in a direction to mitigate the eﬃciency
loss originating from the R&D externality. Thus, the results in this alternative setting would be
essentially similar to what the wage tax could achieve, though quantitatively diﬀerent.
The household chooses consumption c and leisure l to maximize its utility in (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2), taking the interest and wage rates as given. Solving this problem yields:
γ ≡ ˙ c/c =( r − ρ)/θ, (3)
c =( 1− τ)wl/ . (4)
Equation (3) is standard in the literature, linking consumption growth positively to the rate of
return on assets (r) and the willingness of intertemporal substitution (1/θ) but negatively to the
rate of time preference (ρ). Equation (4) captures the relationship between consumption and leisure.








= 0, i.e. neither debt nor asset
will be left at the end of the planning horizon.
2.2 Final production
A ﬁnal good is produced by a large number of identical competitive ﬁrms. A ﬁrm i uses Xij units
of intermediate good j and Li units of labor to produce Yi units of the ﬁnal good according to:





αdj, A > 0, 0 < α < 1, (5)
where A is a productivity parameter, N is the number of available intermediate goods, and α
measures the importance of intermediate good j relative to labor in ﬁnal production. Since Xij =




where output growth is driven by expanding the variety of intermediate goods N.






αdj − wLi − (1 − sx)
8 N
0
pjXijdj, 0 ￿ sx < 1,s y ≥ 0, (7)
where the price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to unity, pj is the price of intermediate good j
measured in units of the ﬁnal good, and sy and sx are respectively subsidies to ﬁnal output and to the
purchase of intermediate goods. In the ﬁnal-good sector, factors are paid by their marginal products:
(1 + sy)FXij =( 1− sx)pj and (1 + sy)FLi = w. The optimal condition (1 + sy)FXij =( 1− sx)pj











where Γ is a function of the subsidy rates sx and sy. The optimal condition (1 + sy)FLi = w gives
ﬁrm i’s demand for labor, Li =( 1−α)(1+sy)Yi/w. Equating aggregate labor demand and supply,
i.e.,

i Li = L(1 − l), the equilibrium quantity of labor is equal to
L(1 − l)=( 1− α)(1 + sy)Y/w. (9)
2.3 Expansions of the variety of intermediate goods
We adopt several assumptions in the literature to simplify the analysis. First, the R&D process is
deterministic, i.e. investing η ﬁxed units of the ﬁnal good in R&D creates a new type of intermediate
good. Also, innovators are given permanent monopoly rights over the production and sale of their
invented intermediate goods, and one unit of any intermediate good can be produced using one
unit of the ﬁnal good (i.e., a unit marginal cost). Finally, there is free entry in the R&D sector.
With the permanent monopoly right, the value of a new technology (the discounted present








5where r is the interest rate. Without any state variable in (10), the problem maxpj Vt is equivalent to
max
pj
[(pj − 1)Xj]=m a x
pj
+
(pj − 1)ΓL(1 − l)(αpj)1/(α−1)

. (11)
Since an individual supplier of intermediate good j is negligible compared to a continuum of inter-
mediate goods with a mass N, we assume that it takes the quantity of aggregate labor L(1 − l),
the wage, and the prices of other intermediate goods and the ﬁnal good as given when making its
own price decision. The problem in (11) gives the monopoly pricing rule:
pj = p =1 /α > 1. (12)
That is, the monopoly sets a constant markup on the unit marginal cost. Also note that the price
is the same for all intermediate goods by symmetry.
Combining (8) and (12) yields the equilibrium quantity of an intermediate good
Xj = X ≡ ΓL(1 − l), (13)
which is also constant over time and the same for all intermediate goods. With free entry into the





(1 − α)ΓL(1 − l)
(1 − sn)αη
. (14)
By (14) and the deﬁnition of Γ, the rate of return on R&D investment r depends on the subsidies
(sy,s x,s n) and leisure l. Also, this rate of return is increasing with the size of the labor force L.
In other words the model suﬀers from a “level eﬀect” as discussed in Jones (1995).4
2.4 Government
The government taxes labor income at a ﬂat rate τ to ﬁnance the subsidies:
τw(1 − l)L = syY + sxNX/α + snηγNN, (15)
where γN ≡ ˙ N/N is the growth rate of the variety of intermediate goods. In (15), the left-hand
side is the total revenue from labor income taxes and the right-hand side is the total expenditure
4When the “level eﬀect” is removed, the welfare diﬀerences for diﬀerent policies may be smaller in the light of
Jones (1995). In our simulation later, we will remove the level eﬀect by normalizing L to unity in the benchmark
parameterization, and explore the remaining welfare diﬀerences across diﬀerent policies.
6on subsidizing ﬁnal output (syY ), the purchase of intermediate goods (sxNX/α)a n di n v e s t m e n t
in R&D (snηγNN). As other types of taxes only lead to quantitative rather than qualitative
alterations, we ignore them for simplicity. However, we will explicitly have a consumption tax later
when focusing on whether subsidies funded by distortionary taxes can achieve the social optimum.
3. The social planner’s problem
In order to see whether the socially optimal outcome can be achieved in a decentralized setting, we










subject to the following resource constraint
Y = A[L(1 − l)]1−αNXα = Lc + η ˙ N + NX.
The solution is given by:
lsp =
 ηρ(Aα)−α/(1−α) −  AL(1 − α)(1 − θ)
θAL(1 − α) −  AL(1 − α)(1 − θ)
, (17)
Xsp =( Aα)1/(1−α)L(1 − lsp), (18)
γsp =( 1− α)Xsp/(αηθ) − ρ/θ, (19)
csp = c0eγspt with c0 ≡ A[L(1 − lsp)]1−αN0[(1 − α)(θ − 1) + αηρ/Xsp]. (20)
The welfare function is:


















The transversality condition implies ρ−(1−θ)γsp > 0. For later comparisons with the decentralized
equilibrium, Table 1 shows the social optimum in terms of the ratio of R&D investment to output,
the growth rate, and welfare for various parameterizations. The benchmark parameterization is
brieﬂy noted in Table 1 and is to be discussed with more details later.
74. The decentralized equilibrium with subsidies
The decentralized economy in this type of model is known to be always in a balanced equilibrium for
any constant subsidy rates set by the government, whereby the proportional allocations of output
and time and the growth rate are all constant over time, and the growth rate is the same for ﬁnal
output, consumption, and the rate of innovation. Because of the labor-leisure choice, the derivation
of the growth rate is much more involved than in a standard R&D model with ﬁxed labor supply.
We ﬁrst rewrite (3) as: r = θγ + ρ. Substituting it into (14) provides X = αη(1 − sn)(θγ +
ρ)/(1−α), which, together with (13), gives l =1−αη(1−sn)(θγ+ρ)/[(1−α)ΓL]. Also, combining
(9), (13) and the ﬁnal-output function Y = A[L(1 − l)]1−αNXα yields w =( 1− α)(1 + sy)ANΓα.
Finally, substituting (4) and the above expressions of (X,l,w,Y) into the resource constraint for
the economy, C = Lc = Y − ηγNN − NX, leads to the solution for the growth rate:
γ=
[(1−α)ΓL−(1−sn)αηρ](1−α)(1−τ)(1+sy)AΓα−1− αηρ(1 − sn)(AΓα−1−1)
θαη(1−α)(1−sn)(1−τ)(1+sy)AΓα−1 +  θαη(1−sn)(AΓα−1−1)− η(1−α)
(22)




(1 − α)(1 + sy)
+
αsx
(1 − α)(1 − sx)
+
αγsn
(1 − sn)(1 − sx)(θγ + ρ)
(23)
which arises from dividing both sides of the government budget constraint (15) by ﬁnal output Y
and arranging terms. Therefore, (22) and (23) jointly determine the equilibrium solution for the
growth rate. Now we can see that the subsidies (sx,s y, sn)a ﬀect the growth rate γ.T h ee ﬀects of
subsidies (sx,s y)o ng r o w t ha l s og ot h r o u g ht h ef a c t o rΓ deﬁned in (8).
To facilitate the welfare analysis, we also derive the solution for the equilibrium welfare level as a
function of the tax and subsidies. Given the initial number of intermediate goods N0, the subsequent
number is determined by the exponential expansion N = N0eγt. Also, given the solution for γ,w e
can obtain the solution for consumption and leisure:




[1 − sx − α2(1 + sy)](1 − sn)(θγ + ρ)





αη(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ)
(1 − α)ΓL
. (25)
As in the social planner’s problem, the welfare function is of the form:
















where γ, c0 and l are respectively given by (22), (24) and (25). Moreover, the transversality
condition implies ρ − (1 − θ)γ > 0. We can now compare diﬀerent types of subsidies.
We begin with the equivalence between subsidies provided to ﬁnal output sy and to the purchase
of intermediate goods sx and any combination of them. Deﬁne sf ≡ (sx+sy)/(1−sx)a st h ee ﬀective
subsidy rate to ﬁnal output (hereafter, the production subsidy), then (1 + sy)/(1 − sx)=1+sf
and Γ =[ α2A(1 + sf)]1/(1−α).I t s u ﬃces to show that it is the eﬀective subsidy rate sf,n o tt h e
decomposition between sx and sy, that matters for both the growth rate γ and welfare U.U s i n g


















{θ(1 − sn)[1 − α(1 + sf)] − (1 − α)snα(1 + sf)}







ρ(1 − sn)[1 − α(1 + sf)] +  ρ2(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)].
To guarantee that the growth rate γ given by (27) is nonnegative, we assume that Ψ1 > 0, Ψ2 < 0
and Ψ3 < 0.5 From (27), we can see that the growth rate depends on the combined eﬀective subsidy
rate sf rather than individual subsidy rates sx and sy. Also, leisure l is a function of the eﬀective





[1 − α2(1 + sf)](1 − sn)(θγ + ρ)




5This assumption holds true if θ > α and if ρ is suﬃciently small in the absence of any subsidy. The need of a small
enough ρ is standard for γ > 0 by (3). Also, the restriction θ ≥ α is not binding in the real world since most related




9Thus, the welfare function given by (26) depends on the eﬀective subsidy rate sf as does the growth
rate. Summarizing our discussion, we have
Proposition 1: With elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes, the subsidies to ﬁnal output or
to the purchase of intermediate goods are equivalent concerning their eﬀects on growth and welfare.
The equivalence between these two types of subsidies was seen in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
with lump-sum taxes and ﬁxed labor supply. Here, we extend it to the case with a labor-leisure
choice and distortionary taxes. With Proposition 1, we can now focus on the production subsidy
sf and the R&D subsidy sn in the rest of the paper.
Setting sx =0a n dsf = sy, the government budget constraint (23) becomes




Using (22) and (25), we have the solution for leisure:
l = Υ1/Υ2, (30)
where
Υ1 ≡  ηρ(1 − sn)Γ−α/α +  AL{θ(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α − (1 − α)(1 + sf)},
Υ2 ≡  AL{θ(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α − (1 − α)(1 + sf)}
+ ALθ(1 − sn)(1 − α)(1 + sf)(1 − τ)/α.
We can then express c0, X and γ as
c0 =
ΓN0l(1 − τ)(1 − α)
α2 
, (31)








Before comparing the subsidies, it is interesting to compare the decentralized equilibrium solu-
tion without any subsidies and taxes with the social planner’s solution. First, from (30) and (17),
10leisure is higher in the former solution than in the latter. Conversely, from (32) and (18), the equi-
librium quantity of intermediate goods is lower in the former than in the latter, partly also because
at sy = sn =0 ,Γ =[ α2A]1/(1−α) < (αA)1/(1−α) due to the monopoly pricing p =1 /α allowed in the
former. As a result, the growth rate is lower in the former than in the latter, according to (33) and
(19). The intuition is that in the presence of the externality of the variety expansion, the perceived
rates of return to working and innovation in this decentralized economy without subsidies are lower
than the social rates. Granting monopoly rights to innovators alone does not close the gap in the
rates of return as pricing intermediate goods above their marginal costs reduces the demand for
intermediate goods.
It may appear that ﬁnancing subsidies through a lump-sum tax can achieve the socially optimal
solution. This was indeed the case in Barro and Sala-i-Martin: With inelastic labor supply in their
model, setting the ﬁnal production subsidy rate as 1 + sy =1 /α (i.e. equalizing the user cost and
the marginal cost of intermediate goods) would imply Γ =[ α2A(1 + sy)]1/(1−α) =( αA)1/(1−α) and
hence would achieve the socially optimal quantity of intermediate goods X.B u t i n o u r m o d e l ,
this is insuﬃcient to obtain the socially optimal quantity of X = ΓL(1 − l) since the level of labor
per worker 1 − l at this particular subsidy rate remains below its socially optimal level. That is,
lowering the user cost of intermediate goods to their marginal cost by the production subsidy to
correct the eﬃciency loss of monopoly pricing is not enough to achieve the social optimum with
elastic labor. Subsidizing R&D investment by a lump-sum tax cannot achieve the socially optimal
solution either, since when X becomes the same as in the social planner’s solution, a positive sn in
(33) will lead to excessive growth compared to that in the social planner’s solution in (19).
4.1 Growth-maximizing subsidies
Before turning to the analysis of optimal subsidies, we compare the two types of subsidies and their
mix in terms of their eﬀectiveness in promoting growth, for at least two reasons. First, growth is
important in its own right, both in theory and in practice. Second, the type of subsidy that is
more conducive to growth can gain more dynamic eﬃciency in dealing with the R&D externality
11and monopoly pricing, and thus is a possible candidate to improve welfare.






[1 − α(1 + sf)] −  ρ[1 − α2(1 + sf)]
θ[1 − α(1 + sf)] +  θ[1 − α2(1 + sf)] −  (1 − α)α(1 + sf)
. (34)
We then observe the following (see Appendix A for the proof):
Proposition 2: For θ ≥ α and a small enough ρ, the growth rate is globally concave with respect
to the production subsidy, and reaches its global maximum at a ﬁnite positive value of the subsidy.
Intuitively, the production subsidy exerts opposing forces on growth. The positive force on
growth is standard and obvious. Missing in models with lump-sum taxes is the negative force
arising from the accompanying rise in the tax distortion that reduces labor supply and in turn
lowers the demand for intermediate goods by (13). Further, the positive eﬀect falls with the
subsidy rate due to diminishing marginal product of intermediate goods in ﬁnal production. Thus,
when the subsidy rate is low (high), the positive (negative) eﬀect dominates. When the opposing
eﬀects exactly cancel out at a positive rate of the subsidy, the growth rate peaks.
Under the R&D subsidy sn, the growth rate is determined by (27) with sf =0 ,i . e . ,
γ(sn)=
















− ρ(1 − sn)[1 +  (1 + α)]
M
.
The growth eﬀects of the R&D subsidy are summarized below (see Appendix A for the proof).
Proposition 3: For θ ≥ α and a small enough ρ, the growth rate is globally concave with respect
to the R&D subsidy, and reaches its global maximum at a ﬁnite positive value of the subsidy.
12Like the production subsidy, the tax distortion has a negative eﬀect on growth. Unlike the
production subsidy, however, the R&D subsidy stim u l a t e sg r o w t hb yd i r e c t l yr e d u c i n gt h ec o s to f
R&D investment. There is a positive rate of the R&D subsidy that maximizes the growth rate.
An important question can then be posed: Which of these subsidies can lead to a higher
growth rate? An analytical investigation into this question is complicated, because of the complex
expressions of the growth rate in (34) and (35). We thus appeal to numerical simulations with
various parameterizations. A benchmark parameterization is set as: α =0 .3, θ =1 .5,   =0 .5,
η =2 .02, ρ =0 .05 and A = L = N0 = 1. Here, the values of (α, ,θ,ρ) are within the standard
ranges used in the literature,6 while those of (A,L,η) are chosen such that the (welfare-maximizing)
growth rate would equal 3.0% in the decentralized equilibrium with the R&D subsidy. This scenario
is calibrated to the United States which has an average growth rate around 3.0% for the last 30
years and has used an R&D subsidy, not the production subsidy. In other parameterizations, we
allow the values of the parameters to vary around their benchmark levels, and see whether the
results are sensitive to the variations in parameterization. We report the results in Table 2 which
also gives the numerical solution for the social planner’s problem for comparisons.
For all the parameterizations with which we have experimented, the R&D subsidy always leads
to a higher growth rate than does the production subsidy. And the tax rate (for growth-maximizing)
is lower under the R&D subsidy than under the production subsidy unless the latter cannot achieve
positive growth. With the benchmark parameterization, for example, the growth rate is only 0.35%
(with a tax rate of 90%) under the production subsidy, but is 5.94% (with a tax rate of 84%) under
the R&D subsidy. Further, the growth-maximizing combinations of subsidies are the same as the
growth-maximizing R&D subsidies for all the parameterizations.
To provide a global view, Figures 1(a) and 1(b) depict the relationship between the combi-
nations of the two types of subsidies and the resulting growth rates under the same benchmark
parameterization (viewed from diﬀerent angles). From these ﬁgures, it is clear that only the R&D
6The value of the key parameter   =0 .5 is taken directly from Lucas (1990), while the values θ =1 .5, ρ =0 .05
and α =0 .3( i m p l y i n gal a b o r ’ ss h a r eo f0 .7) are based on the growth calibration exercises in Lucas (1990), King and
Rebelo (1990), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
13subsidy should be used to maximize the growth rate, corresponding to the mix of subsidies (sf,s n)
=( 0 ,86.15%) in Table 2.
Overall, the two types of subsidies aﬀect R&D incentives quite diﬀerently. The R&D subsidy
directly lowers the cost of R&D investment, while the production subsidy indirectly raises the
marginal beneﬁt of R&D investment by strengthening the demand for intermediate goods. It turns
out that the more directly a subsidy aﬀects R&D incentives, the more eﬀectively it promotes growth.
In fact, as shown in Table 2, the R&D subsidy may generate excess growth compared to the growth
rate in the social planner’s solution (derived in Section 3), while the production subsidy always
produces a lower growth rate than the socially optimal growth rate.
It is also interesting to see how the variations in the parameters aﬀect growth in Table 2. As one
may expect, a higher rate of time preference ρ or a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution
1/θ leads to a lower growth rate, because individuals are less willing to save. Higher productivity
in ﬁnal production A or a larger labor force L raises the rate of return on investment in R&D,
resulting in a higher growth rate. Similarly, a lower cost of R&D η raises investment in R&D,
leading to a higher growth rate. A stronger taste for leisure   decelerates growth by increasing
leisure (and thus reducing labor supply). Finally, a higher value of α, i.e. a more important role of
intermediate goods relative to labor in ﬁnal production, decelerates growth by lowering the demand
for intermediate goods and hence the price of intermediate goods 1/α.
4.2 Optimal production subsidies
Setting sn = 0 in (29) leads to τ = sf/[(1 − α)(1 + sf)]. Thus, the welfare function under the










where (c0(sf),l(sf),γ(sf)) can be found by substituting sn =0a n dτ = sf/[(1 − α)(1 + sf)] into
equations (30)-(33) as follows. First, note that the government budget balance τ = sf/[(1−α)(1+
sf)] in this case fully determines τ by the share parameter α and the subsidy rate sf. Substituting
this budget balance and sn = 0 into (30) for τ and sn allows us to obtain the reduced-form solution
14for leisure l(sf). Further, substituting l(sf), sn =0a n dτ = sf/[(1 − α)(1 + sf)] into (31), (32)
and (33) leads to reduced-form solutions for c0(sf), X(sf)a n dγ(sf). We thus have:
Proposition 4: For a large enough θ (e.g. θ ≥ 1), the welfare level reaches its global maximum at
a ﬁnite positive value of the production subsidy.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (36) with respect to sf,w eh a v es i g n U 
0(sf)=s i g n Θ(sf), where
Θ(sf) ≡  αAL
l
ALθ(θ − 1)(1 − α)+













(1 − α)(1 + sf)
+
[Γ/(1 + sf)]Υ2(Υ2 − Υ1)
Υ2αηρ − (1 − θ)(1 − α)Γ(Υ2 − Υ1)
−
Υ2
[1 − α(1 + sf)](1 + sf)
. (37)
When sf = τ = 0, the expression in the ﬁrst bracket on the right-hand side of (37) becomes
proportional to Υ2 − Υ1. Thus, by converting Υ1 and Υ2 back to l or 1 − l, (37) becomes:
sign Θ(0) = sign
F
(1 − l)(1 +  )
￿




αηρ − (1 − θ)(1 − α)Γ(1 − l)
]k
.
Note that Θ(0) > 0a tl e a s tf o rθ ≥ 1, because the denominator of the second term is positive
under the transversality condition and because the rest is obviously positive. If sf were too high,
e.g. pushing τ towards 1, the remaining resource for consumption would be too little. In this
scenario, further rises in sf would surely decrease welfare. Thus, the welfare level must reach its
global maximum for some sf ∈ (0,∞) under θ ≥ 1, given the underlying continuity of U0(sf).
Starting with too little R&D investment and too much leisure without any subsidy, an increase
in the production subsidy encourages R&D investment and thus stimulates growth as mentioned
earlier, moving in the direction toward their socially optimal levels. The accelerated growth thus
enhances welfare over time. On the other hand, however, an accompanying increase in the labor
income tax tends to raise leisure further above its socially optimal level, leading to a lower level of
welfare. When the subsidy rate is low, the tax distortion is weak and the eﬃciency gain from faster
growth dominates, leading to a net gain in welfare. Obviously, if the production subsidy is very
15high, the tax distortion becomes stronger and eventually dominates the positive welfare eﬀect. In
other words, there should be a positive rate of the subsidy at which welfare is maximized.
Although Proposition 4 gives the existence of the value of the production subsidy that maximizes
welfare, it is diﬃcult to show analytically whether welfare is globally concave with this subsidy for
the welfare-maximizing subsidy to be unique. Numerically, Table 3 gives the simulation results for
welfare using the same parameterizations as in Tables 1 and 2. There indeed exists a unique positive
welfare-maximizing production subsidy for each of the parameterizations, as shown in Figure 2 (a).
4.3 Optimal R&D subsidies
























Unlike the previous case with sf > 0a n dsn = 0, the current case with sn > 0a n dsf =0h a s
no reduced-form solutions: the ﬁve variables c0, τ, l, X and γ are implicitly determined by ﬁve
equations (29)-(33). It is thus diﬃcult to derive analytical results concerning the welfare eﬀect of
the R&D subsidy. For this reason, we again perform numerical simulations and report the results in
Table 3. For each of the parameterizations, there is a unique optimal R&D subsidy rate. With the
benchmark parameterization, for instance, the optimal R&D subsidy is 76.33% and the maximum
welfare level is −65.30. Clearly, the welfare curve in Figure 2(b) is smooth and single-peaked, and
the magnitude of the welfare gain can be substantial. Thus, like the production subsidy, the R&D
subsidy can improve welfare by promoting R&D investment and growth but can reduce welfare by
raising the tax distortion. When the opposing eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other at a positive rate of
the R&D subsidy, the welfare level peaks.
16The results in Table 3 also help understand how and why the variations in the key parameters
aﬀect welfare, together with the aid of equation (26) that links welfare to leisure, initial consumption
and the growth rate. For example, a fall in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (a rise in
θ) indicates less willingness to save. As a result, it may raise leisure and initial consumption and
hence raise welfare on the one hand; but it may decelerate growth and hence reduce welfare on the
other hand. (Of course, a higher θ also changes welfare without going through any of the variables
l, c0 and γ.) The negative growth eﬀect turns out to dominate and results in a net decline in
welfare. Also, a rise in the cost of R&D investment η has opposing eﬀects on both leisure and
initial consumption, but certainly has a negative eﬀect on growth. Consequently, it is most likely
that the growth eﬀect of a higher cost of R&D dominates, and leads to a net decline in welfare.
Further, a stronger taste for leisure   raises welfare by increasing leisure and reduces welfare by
decreasing initial consumption and the growth rate, resulting in a net decline in welfare.
Another interesting point is that a change in a particular parameter may change the relative
eﬀectiveness of the two subsidies in raising welfare, given the diﬀerent characteristics of the two
subsidies. Through reducing the R&D cost, the R&D subsidy is more eﬀective in removing the
dynamic eﬃciency loss of the R&D externality by raising the growth rate, but less eﬀective in
reducing the static eﬃciency loss of monopoly pricing. In contrast, the production subsidy directly
reduces the user cost of intermediate goods, and thus is more eﬀective in reducing the static eﬃciency
loss but less eﬀective in reducing the dynamic eﬃciency loss. Concerning tax distortions, the R&D
subsidy requires a much lower labor income tax rate than the production subsidy to achieve any
given growth target, since the subsidy base is muchs m a l l e ri nt h ef o r m e rc a s e( t h eR & Di n v e s t m e n t )
than in the latter case (ﬁnal output). A change in a particular parameter changes the magnitudes
of these eﬃciency gains and losses.
For example, when the taste for leisure is weaker (e.g.,   =0 .3), the production subsidy generates
a higher welfare level than does the R&D subsidy in Table 3, reversing the ranking with the
benchmark parameterization. This is mainly because, when leisure is less important, the labor
income tax distortion is weaker. When leisure becomes more important (e.g.,   =0 .7), the ranking
17goes back to that with the benchmark parameterization. When the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is higher (e.g. θ =1 .1) than its benchmark level (greater willingness to save), the
R&D subsidy remains better than the production subsidy, as the dynamic eﬃciency loss, which
is better handled by the R&D subsidy, becomes even more important. When the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is lower (e.g. θ = 2, or 3), the welfare ranking can be reversed. When
the rate of time preference is higher than the benchmark level (ρ =0 .08), the production subsidy
cannot generate any positive growth and is thus ranked below the R&D subsidy. When the rate of
time preference is much reduced (ρ =0 .02), the growth rates are rather high in both cases while
the welfare ranking of the subsidies is reversed, indicating that the static eﬃciency loss is now the
chief concern, which is better handled by the production subsidy. Further, when the cost of R&D
investment η is much lower (say η = 1) than its benchmark, the ranking of the subsidies is reversed,
b e c a u s en o wt h es t a t i ce ﬃciency loss becomes more important. When the cost of R&D investment
is higher than its benchmark (say η = 3), the ranking goes back to that with the benchmark
parameterization. We thus conclude: In terms of improving welfare, the R&D subsidy can be more
or less eﬀective than the production subsidy depending on parameterizations.
These results are in sharp contrast with those in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In their model
with lump-sum taxes and ﬁxed labor supply, the production subsidy always dominates the R&D
subsidy, because the former can completely recover both the static eﬃciency loss (low demand for
intermediate goods) and the dynamic eﬃciency loss (the low growth rate) while the latter cannot.
With the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ in our model, however, the production subsidy is not eﬀective in
bringing leisure down to its socially best level, even when the tax is lump sum, as mentioned earlier.
When a labor income tax is used, the production subsidy entails more tax distortions than the R&D
subsidy, pushing leisure further up from its socially optimal level. Thus, in our model the R&D
subsidy can be more or less eﬀective than the production subsidy depending on parameterizations.
184.4 Optimal combination of production and R&D subsidies
Now we want to see whether combining these two subsidies can do better than using one of them
alone. To do so, we ﬁrst rewrite the government budget constraint (23) as:











Then, as shown in Appendix B, the utility-maximizing problem of the government by choice of
(τ,s f,s n) subject to its constraint in (41) is equivalent to the following unconstrained problem that
chooses (sf,s n) to maximize:







































(1 − τ)(1 − α)2(1 + sf)θΓL(1 − l)
−
1
(1 − τ)(1 − α)(1 + sf)2 +
1
(1 − α)(1 + sf)
+
ΓL(1 − l)





















(1 − τ)θ(1 − sn)2 +
ηα2ρ
(1 − τ)(1 − α)θΓL(1 − l)
+
(1 − α)ΓL(1 − l)
{αρ(1 − sn)η − (1 − θ)(1 − α)ΓL(1 − l)}(1 − sn)
=0 , (44)
where ∂l/∂sf and ∂l/∂sn are given in Appendix B. Thus we have:
19Proposition 5: The optimal mix of (sf,s n) is implicitly determined by (41), (43), (44) and (53).
To reveal the quantitative implications of the optimal mix of subsidies, we use numerical sim-
ulations and report the results in Table 4 with the same parameterizations as in previous tables.
For each parameterization, there is a unique welfare-maximizing combination of the two types of
subsidies. For example, with the benchmark parameterization, the optimal mix of these subsidies is
(sf,s n)=( 7 3 .84%,53.01%), and the resulting welfare is −58.32, which is substantially higher than
the welfare level without subsidies (−73.90). The relationship between the combination of these
subsidies and the welfare level with the same benchmark parameterization is depicted in Figures
3(a) and 3(b) for an easier view from diﬀerent angles. According to the simulation results, combin-
ing the two types of subsidies gives a higher level of welfare than a single subsidy. For example, in
Table 3 with the benchmark parameterization, the production subsidy obtains a maximum welfare
level of −67.41 while the R&D subsidy obtains a maximum welfare level of −65.30, both of which
are much lower than that (−58.32) achieved by their optimal mix in Table 4.
The key point of using both subsidies simultaneously rather than separately is to take advantage
of their relative strengths. While the production subsidy is more eﬀective in removing the static
distortion of the monopoly pricing by stimulating the demand for intermediate goods, the R&D
subsidy tends to be more eﬀective in removing the dynamic distortion by promoting growth. As a
result, mixing both types of subsidies does better than using them in separation.
We now consider whether there is any ﬁrst-best combination of (sn,s f) ﬁnanced by a labor
income tax at rate τ and a consumption tax at rate τc. The government budget constraint becomes
τcLc + Lw(1 − l)τ = snηγN + sfY, (45)
and accordingly the household budget constraint is given by
˙ a = ar + w(1 − l)(1 − τ) − c(1 + τc). (46)
The equilibrium solution is given by:
l =
 ηρ(αA)−α/(1−α) +  AL[θ(1 − α) − (1 − α)/(1 − sn)]
 AL[θ(1 − α) − (1 − α)/(1 − sn)] + ALθ(1 − α)(1 − τ)/[α(1 + τc)]
, (47)








To achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome in a decentralized equilibrium (i.e., l = lsp, X = Xsp and γ = γsp),
we must satisfy the following three conditions:
(A).s f =( 1− α)/α;( B).s n =0 ; ( C). 1 − τ = α(1 + τc).
To be feasible, conditions (A)-(C) must also meet the government budget balance:
(D). τ =
lsp −  (1 − lsp) − αlsp
lsp −  (1 − lsp)
< 1.
Note that, to be incentive compatible, the labor income tax rate should be less than 1, i.e., τ < 1.
Under these restrictions, the ﬁr s tb e s tc a nn e v e rb ea c h i e v e da ss h o w nb e l o w :
Proposition 6: No combination of (sf,s n,τ,τc) can achieve the ﬁrst best outcome for τ < 1.
Proof. By (D), whether there exists any labor income tax rate less than 1 such that conditions
(A)-(D) hold depends on the sign of lsp −  (1 − lsp). If lsp −  (1 − lsp) < 0, then τ > 1 under
condition (D). Now, suppose lsp −  (1 − lsp) > 0. Combining this with the solution for lsp,w e
have: α(1 +  )ηρ > (αA)1/(1−α)L(1 − α). Also, note that γsp ≥ 0 has to hold in this model
since the worse growth performance is not to innovate at all (zero growth). That is, we have
(αA)1/(1−α)L(1 − lsp)(1 − α) ≥ ραη. Combining the above two conditions yields







which implies that lsp −  (1 − lsp) < 0, reaching a contradiction.
From this proposition, we can see that the optimal combination of subsidies in Proposition 5 is
only the second best. This result is illustrated quantitatively by the simulation results in Tables 3
and 4 in which the numerical solutions for the social planner’s problem are also provided. The result
here is in sharp contrast with that in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) in which using the production
subsidy alone (or a subsidy to the purchase of intermediate goods) can induce the decentralized
equilibrium to achieve the social optimum with a lump-sum tax. As they speculated, once the
subsidy has to be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes, the social optimum may not be achievable.
215. Conclusion
We have examined the growth and welfare implications of various subsidies by extending a standard
R&D growth model to incorporate elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes. The results diﬀer
substantially from those in the literature. With inelastic labor supply and lump-sum taxes in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the social optimum can be attained by subsidizing either ﬁnal output or
the purchase of intermediate products. However, in our model none of the subsidies can achieve the
social optimum, because in the presence of the R&D externality they cannot bring leisure down to
its socially optimal level, although they all simulate R&D investment and growth. Also, in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), subsidizing either ﬁnal output or the purchase of intermediate goods is
deﬁnitely better than subsidizing R&D investment, as the former, not the latter, can achieve the
social optimum. In our model, which type of the subsidies leads to a higher welfare level is unclear
and depends on parameterizations; in particular, the R&D subsidy is more eﬀective in promoting
growth and may obtain higher welfare levels than the other forms of subsidies. The possibility that
the R&D subsidy is better than the production subsidy is largely due to the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ
and their diﬀerent requirements for tax revenue in our model. Moreover, in our approach mixing
the two types of subsidies does better than using them in separation in maximizing welfare.
Also diﬀerent from the literature are the policy implications of our results given the real-world
tax system that consists of mainly income and consumption taxes. If growth is a chief concern as in
many nations, subsidizing R&D is surely better than subsidizing either ﬁnal output or the purchase
of intermediate goods. Even if social welfare is the sole criterion, our results are not against the
common practice of subsidizing R&D investment as observed in industrial nations, since the R&D
subsidy can still improve on a decentralized equilibrium with or without other forms of subsidies.
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Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . To see the response of γ(sf) to a change in sf,w ed i ﬀerentiate (34)
with respect to sf.T h e nw eh a v e :s i g nγ (sf)=s i g n Φ(sf), where
Φ(sf) ≡ αη{ΓL[1 − α(1 + sf)]/(1 + sf) − α[(1 − α)ΓL − αηρ]+ α3ηρ}
×{θ[1 − α(1 + sf)] +  θ[1 − α2(1 + sf)] −  α(1 − α)(1 + sf)}
+α2η{[(1 − α)ΓL − αηρ][1 − α(1 + sf)] −  αηρ[1 − α2(1 + sf)]}[θ +  αθ +  (1 − α)].
When sf =0 ,w eh a v e :Φ(0) = αηΓL(1−α)2[ (θ−α)(1−α)+ α(1−α)+θ(1+ α)]− α3η2ρ(1+
 )(1 − α). For any meaningful solution, we must have γ(sf) ≥ 0a tsf = 0 which can usually be
guaranteed by a small enough ρ,i m p l y i n g( 1− α)ΓL ≥ αηρ[1 +  (1 + α)] by (34). Substituting
this into Φ(0) and noting that the coeﬃcient on ΓL is positive under θ ≥ α,w eh a v eΦ(0) ≥
ρα3η2(1−α)[ (1−α)+1+2α +α 2] > 0. We then show γ (sf) < 0a tah i g hl e v e lo fsf. Suppose
sf =( 1−α)/(2−α) such that τ = 1. It is obvious by (22) that γ(sf) cannot be positive at such a
level of sf, starting with any γ(sf) > 0f o rsf =0 .T h u s ,γ (sf) < 0 must occur before sf is raised
to the level (1 − α)/(2 − α). So γ (sf)=0m u s th o l df o rs o m esf > 0. Since




1 − α(1 + sf) − (1 − α)([1 + α(1 + sf)]
(1 − α)α2(1 + sf)2
M
=s i g n {−α[αsf +( 1− α)(1 + sf)]} < 0,
Φ(sf) is monotonically decreasing in sf and thus the solution for Φ(sf) = 0 is unique. Thus, for
θ ￿ α and a small enough ρ (such that γ > 0), γ is globally concave with respect to sf and reaches
am a x i m u ml e v e la t0<s f < ∞.
23P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .W es e tsf = 0 and use (22) and (23) to rewrite the growth rate in terms
of both the R&D subsidy sn and the tax rate τ:
γ(sn)=
[(1 − α)ΓL/(αη) − (1 − sn)ρ](1 − τ) −  ρ(1 + α)(1 − sn)





(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ)
.
Substituting it into (50) for τ and diﬀerentiating the resulting equation with respect to sn,w e
obtain γ (sn)=Λ1/Λ2,w h e r e
Λ1 ≡ αηγθ[θγ + αγ + ρ](1 − sn)+αηγθ[(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ) − αγsn]
+ γαη θ(1 + α)(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ)+γαη[ θ(1 + α)(1 − sn) − α ](θγ + ρ)
− (1 − α)ΓL(θγ + αγ + ρ)+αηρ[(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ) − αγsn]
+ αηρ(1 − sn)(θγ + αγ + ρ)+2 αη ρ(1 + α)(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ),
Λ2 ≡ αηθ(1 − sn)[(1 − sn)(θγ + ρ) − αγsn]+αηγθ(1 − sn)[(1 − sn)θ − αsn]
+ αη(1 − sn)[ θ(1 + α)(1 − sn) − α ](θγ + ρ)+αηγθ(1 − sn)
× [ θ(1 + α)(1 − sn) − α ] − (1 − α)ΓL[θ(1 − sn) − αsn]
+ αηρ(1 − sn)[θ(1 − sn) − αsn]+αη ρθ(1 + α)(1 − sn)2.
By 1−τ =[ ( 1−sn)(θγ+ρ)−αγsn]/[(1−sn)(θγ+ρ)], it is clear that 1−τ =1i fsn =0a n dt h a ti f
sn =1t h e n1−τ ￿ 0 for any non-negative γ. Using (50) to express (1−α)ΓL = αηγ[θ(1−sn)(1−
τ)+ θ(1+α)(1−sn)− α]/(1−τ)+ αηρ(1+α)(1−sn)/(1−τ)+αηρ(1−sn). Substituting out
(1 − α)ΓL in Λ1 and Λ2,w eh a v e :i fsn =0a n di fθ ≥ α, then Λ1,Λ2 > 0, leading to γ (sn) > 0.
If sn =1 ,t h e nγ cannot be positive by (50) and by the expression of (1 − τ). Thus, starting with
sn =0a n da n yp o s i t i v eγ, γ (sn) < 0 must occur before sn rises to 1. Thus, γ (sn)=0f o rs o m e
sn > 0.
24The rest of the proof is to show that Φ (sn) < 0, paralleling the proof of Proposition 2. From
(35), we have: sign γ (sn)=s i g n Φ(sn), where




2(sn) − 2Ψ3(sn)Ψ 











From (51), we have




2(sn)2 + Ψ2(sn)Ψ  











2(sn) − 2Ψ3(sn)Ψ 































3(sn)=−ρ2[1 +  (1 + α)] < 0.
Substituting Ψk(sn), k =1 ,2,3, and their derivatives into (52), we have: if ρ is suﬃciently small,
then Φ (sn) < 0, i.e. Φ(sn) is monotonically decreasing in sn.
Appendix B
Derivation of Equation (42). We use (41) to write an implicit solution for leisure in (25) as a
function of (sf,s n), i.e., l(sf,s n):
lAL{ θ(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α −  (1 − α)(1 + sf)+θ(1 − sn)[1 − α(1 + sf)]/α −
25sn(1 + sf)(1 − α)} +
lAsnαρη(1 + sf)(1 − sn)
(1 − l)Γ
=
η ρ(1 − sn)Γ−α/α +  AL{θ(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α − (1 − α)(1 + sf)}. (53)




2 and ∂l/∂sn = Ωsn
1 /Ωsn
2 ,w h e r e
Ω
sf
1 ≡ αlAL[(  +1 /α)θ(1 − sn)+(   + sn)(1/α − 1)] +
lAαηρsn(1 − sn)[1 − (1 − α)α(1 + sf)]
(1 − α)α(1 + sf)(1 − l)Γ
−
η ρ(1 − sn)
(1 − α)(1 + sf)Γα −  AL[θ(1 − sn)+1− α],
Ω
sf
2 ≡ AL{ θ(1 − sn)(1 − α)/α + θ(1 − sn)[1 − α(1 + sf)]/α − (  + sn)(1 − α)(1 + sf)}
+
Aρηsn(1 − sn)α(1 + sf)




 θ(1 − sn)[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α + θ[1 − α(1 + sf)]/α +( 1− α)(1 + sf)

−
lAηρ(1 − 2sn)α(1 + sf)
Γ(1 − l)




 θ[1 − α2(1 + sf)]/α + θ(1 − sn)[1 − α(1 + sf)]/α − (  + sn)(1 − α)(1 + sf)

+
Aρηsn(1 − sn)α(1 + sf)
Γ(1 − l)2 .
B a s e do nt h es o l u t i o nf o rU0 in (26) and the expression for τ in (41), the utility-maximizing problem
of the government by choice of (τ,s f,s n) subject to its constraint in (41) is equivalent to choosing
(sf,s n) to maximize (42).
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27Table 1
The social planner’s solution
Benchmark parameterization:
α =0 .3, θ =1 .5,   =0 .5, η =2 .02, ρ =0 .05, A = L = N0 =1





α =0 .2 40.80 10.85 -22.77
α =0 .4 23.86 4.93 -59.48
  =0 .3 33.63 8.60 -27.03
  =0 .7 30.99 6.59 -51.92
  =1 .0 28.74 5.34 -68.76
θ =1 .1 45.57 11.47 -20.48
θ =2 .0 23.74 5.27 -74.11
θ =3 .0 15.50 3.30 -270.70
ρ =0 .02 41.23 10.11 -16.92
ρ =0 .08 22.49 4.96 -33.45
η =1 .0 39.88 19.59 -14.18
η =3 .0 24.46 3.67 -51.78
A =0 .5 1.43 0.11 -123.62
A =2 .0 41.63 27.53 12.98
L =0 .5 15.29 1.62 -57.54
L =2 .0 39.81 19.35 -14.53
Note: (1) The benchmark parameters are chosen to be consistent
with those used in the literature and generate a growth rate of
3.0% in a competitive equilibrium with R&D subsidies (the aver-
age growth rate for the past 30 years in the United States). (2)
The optimal R&D rate refers to the ratio of R&D investment to
output.
28Table 2
Growth-maximizing subsidies vs. growth rates
Benchmark parameters: α =0 .3, θ =1 .5,   =0 .5, η =2 .02, ρ =0 .05, A = L = N0 =1
Parameters Social Planner’s Production Subsidy R&D Subsidy
Solution (sf)( sn)
Growth Tax Subsidy Growth Tax Subsidy Growth
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
(%) (%) % % (%) (%) (%)
Benchmark parameterization
7.53 84.59 145.17 0.35 79.67 86.15 5.94
Alternative parameterizations
α =0 .2 10.85 90.38 261.07 1.78 83.76 89.56 9.13
α =0 .4 4.93 77.76 0.00∗ 0.00 76.14 84.13 3.89
  =0 .3 8.60 88.18 161.29 1.84 82.80 85.65 7.55
  =0 .76 . 5 9 0 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 77.62 86.73 4.87
  =1 .05 . 3 4 0 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 75.56 87.62 3.82
θ =1 .1 11.47 84.86 146.30 0.56 80.91 83.53 6.40
θ =2 .0 5.27 84.44 144.56 0.24 78.89 88.38 5.61
θ =3 .0 3.30 84.32 144.03 0.15 78.15 91.14 5.26
ρ =0 .02 10.11 88.14 161.09 3.14 81.21 83.03 6.50
ρ =0 .08 4.96 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 78.85 88.51 5.59
η =1 .0 19.59 87.58 158.45 5.43 80.89 83.58 12.92
η =3 .03 . 6 7 0 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 78.97 88.11 3.80
A =0 .50 . 1 1 0 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 78.10 91.38 1.94
A =2 .0 27.53 88.31 161.89 8.83 81.31 82.86 17.60
L =0 .51 . 6 2 0 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 78.50 89.74 2.72
L =2 .0 19.35 87.55 158.32 5.33 80.88 83.60 12.78
Note: (1) For all the parameterizations, the growth-maximizing mixes of subsidies are the
same as using the R&D subsidy alone. (2) The numbers with ∗ indicate that with these
parameterizations, there do not exist production subsidy rates (and tax rates) that can
induce R&D investment.
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Welfare comparisons of production and R&D subsidies
Benchmark parameters: α =0 .3, θ =1 .5,   =0 .5, η =2 .02, ρ =0 .05, A = L = N0 =1
Parameters Production Subsidy R&D Subsidy
(sf)( sn)
Tax Subsidy Growth Tax Subsidy Growth
Rate Rate Rate Welfare Rate Rate Rate Welfare
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Benchmark parameterization
77.01 116.95 0.17 -67.41 30.55 76.33 3.00 -65.30
Alternative parameterizations
α =0 .2 85.03 212.72 1.51 -46.66 39.93 82.95 5.33 -43.15
α =0 .40 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -90.85 19.03 70.86 1.38 -87.84
  =0 .3 81.64 133.38 1.58 -46.61 36.05 76.38 4.20 -48.43
  =0 .70 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -85.85 25.35 76.38 2.15 -80.03
  =1 .00 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -101.71 17.76 76.54 1.25 -99.01
θ =1 .1 79.14 124.21 0.37 -43.35 41.30 76.24 4.06 -40.64
θ =2 .0 75.23 111.23 0.07 -124.92 23.06 76.40 2.26 -125.41
θ =3 .0 72.99 104.48 0.00∗∗ -516.93 15.48 76.47 1.52 -564.07
ρ =0 .02 82.41 136.34 2.97 -78.98 48.86 75.69 4.86 -81.04
ρ =0 .08 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 -46.19 11.40 76.78 1.11 -45.72
η =1 .0 81.54 132.99 5.08 -40.81 46.01 75.80 9.22 -41.11
η =3 .00 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -73.90 15.14 76.71 0.99 -72.48
A =0 .50 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -146.87 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 -146.87
A =2 .0 82.67 137.36 8.37 -1.70 49.72 75.65 13.32 -2.30
L =0 .50 . 0 0 ∗ 0.00 0.00 -73.90 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 -73.90
L =2 .0 81.50 132.82 4.98 -41.23 45.86 75.80 9.10 -41.51
Note: (1) The numbers with ∗ indicate that under these parameterizations, there do not exist
subsidy rates (and tax rates) that can induce R&D investment. (2) The number with ∗∗ is
the rounded-up growth rate of 0.0025%.
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Optimal combinations of subsidies vs. welfare
Benchmark parameters: α =0 .3, θ =1 .5,   =0 .5, η =2 .02, ρ =0 .05, A = L = N0 =1
Parameters Social Planner’s No Subsidies Combinations of Subsidies
Solution (sf = sn =0 ) ( sf,s n)
Welfare Welfare Tax Rate (%) Subsidy Rates (%) Welfare
Benchmark parameterization
-39.90 -73.90 71.16 (73.84, 53.01) -58.32
Alternative parameterizations
α =0 .2 -22.77 -58.68 77.70 (109.64, 60.33) -37.75
α =0 .4 -59.48 -90.85 64.23 (51.83, 48.80) -79.88
  =0 .3 -27.03 -60.21 76.61 (86.11, 48.47) -40.80
  =0 .7 -51.92 -85.85 67.14 (67.84, 55.55) -73.35
  =1 .0 -68.76 -101.71 62.72 (64.42, 57.60) -92.39
θ =1 .1 -20.48 -46.56 74.28 (71.21, 53.76) -36.94
θ =2 .0 -74.11 -142.16 69.34 (76.06, 52.36) -107.73
θ =3 .0 -270.70 -647.38 67.75 (78.52, 51.64) -437.61
ρ =0 .02 -16.92 -175.12 77.00 (76.21, 49.39) -65.03
ρ =0 .08 -33.45 -46.19 67.04 (78.79, 53.92) -41.55
η =1 .0 -14.18 -73.90 75.95 (75.06, 50.24) -34.38
η =3 .0 -51.78 -73.90 67.71 (77.50, 53.88) -65.74
A =0 .5 -123.62 -146.87 0.00∗ (0.00, 0.00) -146.87
A =2 .0 12.98 -25.48 77.32 (76.63, 49.11) 1.52
L =0 .5 -57.54 -73.90 0.00∗ (0.00, 0.00) -73.90
L =2 .0 -14.53 -73.90 75.90 (75.01, 50.28) -34.77
Note: The numbers with ∗ indicate that for these parameterizations, there do not exist welfare-
maximizing mixes of subsidies that can induce R&D investment.
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